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1 
Chilling: The Constitutional 
Implications of Body-Worn Cameras 
and Facial Recognition Technology at 
Public Protests 
Julian R. Murphy* 
Abstract 
 
In recent years body-worn cameras have been championed by 
community groups, scholars, and the courts as a potential check on 
police misconduct. Such has been the enthusiasm for body-worn 
cameras that, in a relatively short time, they have been rolled out to 
police departments across the country. Perhaps because of the 
optimism surrounding these devices there has been little 
consideration of the Fourth Amendment issues they pose, especially 
when they are coupled with facial recognition technology (FRT). 
There is one particular context in which police use of FRT equipped 
body-worn cameras is especially concerning: public protests. This 
Comment constitutes the first scholarly treatment of this issue. Far 
from a purely academic exercise, the police use of FRT equipped 
body-worn cameras at public protests is sure to confront the courts 
soon. Many police departments have, or will soon have, body-worn 
cameras equipped with real time FRT and a number of police 
departments do not prohibit their members from recording public 
protests. Although primarily descriptive—exploring the state of 
current Fourth Amendment doctrine by predicting its application 
to a hypothetical scenario—this Comment has a normative subtext; 
namely, suggesting that First Amendment values can strengthen 
the Fourth Amendment’s protections against the tide of 
technologically enhanced mass surveillance. 
                                                                                                     
 * Columbia Law School, Postgraduate Public Interest Fellow. BA (Hons); 
LLB (Hons) (Melb); LLM (Columbia). I would like to thank Steven R. Shapiro for 
his remarks on an earlier version of this Comment. Of course, all opinions and 
errors are my own. 
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I. Introduction 
August 12 has passed, and with it the first anniversary of the 
events of Charlottesville, Virginia, which saw the death of Heather 
Heyer and the emboldening of white supremacists across the 
nation. Despite fears of a repeat, the streets of Charlottesville were 
largely peaceful on August 12 this year. But things could have gone 
differently. 
Imagine that Jason Kessler and hundreds of his white 
supremacist acolytes have gathered in Emancipation Park 
(formerly Lee Park) to “celebrate” the events of one year earlier. A 
large group of counter-protestors have assembled some distance 
away to mark the anniversary of Heyer’s death and to decry the 
continued mainstreaming of white supremacy. Both groups are 
assembling consistently with the terms of permits they obtained 
ahead of time from the local authorities. Unlike 2017, the local 
police department is determined to maintain control of the 
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proceedings and has established a cordon of police officers 
separating the two groups. The police are dressed for the occasion 
in full riot gear, including helmets, shields and canisters of tear 
gas. In the hope of deterring potential troublemakers, the police 
department heavily advertised its presence in advance and notified 
the public that police officers would be recording the entire day on 
body-worn cameras fitted with real time facial recognition 
technology. The way such technology operates is that whenever an 
individual exposes their face to the camera that individual is 
instantly compared to a databank of images, identified and then 
electronically tagged throughout the remainder of the footage, 
even when their back is subsequently turned to the camera. 
Knowing this, many protestors arrive at Emancipation Park 
wearing paraphernalia, such as bandanas, intended to confound 
the facial recognition technology. 
Notwithstanding the police efforts, a violent altercation 
breaks out between the opposing groups. Police ultimately regain 
control of the situation and order everyone to disperse. As people 
are leaving the park, police review their body-worn camera footage. 
On the footage, one woman with a Black Lives Matter bandana 
half covering her face can be seen punching Kessler. Although the 
woman’s back was turned to the cameras for the duration of the 
melee, she has been tagged by the facial recognition technology as 
a result of having faced the cameras a few minutes earlier in the 
footage. (The facial recognition technology was able to produce a 
match despite half of the woman’s face being concealed by the 
bandana.) The electronic tag includes not just a name but also a 
residential address, which happens to be on a nearby street in 
Charlottesville. Police central command dispatches a unit to stake 
out the residence and, within an hour, the woman is arrested on 
the pavement outside her front gate. The woman agrees that her 
name is the same as that tagged by the technology but refuses to 
answer further questions. Police are unable to obtain any 
corroborating evidence so they decline to bring charges. (Kessler, 
on the advice of his lawyers, refuses to cooperate with police.) The 
woman subsequently brings a civil suit against the City of 
Charlottesville, seeking damages for the violation of her 
constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment.1 
                                                                                                     
 1. There are admittedly a number of loose ends to this hypothetical. Is facial 
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*** 
The body-worn camera “revolution,”2 as some scholars have 
called it, grew out of events like the death of Michael Brown in 
Ferguson and attendant public demands for increased police 
transparency and accountability.3 Yet in the “moral panic”4 to 
equip officers across the country with these devices, there has been 
insufficient attention paid to the Fourth Amendment implications 
of body-worn cameras, especially those fitted with facial 
recognition technology (FRT). A number of scholars have 
separately considered Fourth Amendment concerns relating to 
                                                                                                     
recognition technology already so advanced that it can produce matches using 
only a portion of a person’s face? How did police lawfully obtain the databank 
image of the plaintiff against which to compare the body-worn camera footage? 
These are interesting questions but not the focus of this Comment. Don’t fight the 
hypothetical. 
 2. Mary D. Fan, Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera 
Revolution, 50 U.C.D. L. REV. 897, 901 (2017). 
 3. See Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy 
Splits, 68 ALA. L. REV. 395, 407–09 (2016) (describing the “police-worn body 
camera revolution” in the wake of the events in Ferguson in 2014); Karson 
Kampfe, Note, Police-Worn Body Cameras: Balancing Privacy and Accountability 
Through State and Police Department Action, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1153, 1154–55 
(2015) (discussing the rapid uptick of body-worn cameras as a response to Michael 
Brown’s death and other similar tragedies); Howard M. Wasserman, Moral Panic 
and Body Cameras, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 831, 832 (2015) (stating that “one 
significant policy suggestion has emerged from the [Ferguson] controversy: 
equipping police officers with body cameras”); cf. Iesha S. Nunes, Note, “Hands 
up, Don’t Shoot”: Police Misconduct and the Need for Body Cameras, 67 FLA. L. 
REV. 1811, 1815–21 (2015) (describing pre-Ferguson incidents of police uses of 
force against black civilians that arguably also contributed to the groundswell of 
support for body-worn cameras). 
 4. Wasserman, supra note 3, at 832. 
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body-worn cameras5 and FRT,6 but few have the examined the 
unique constitutional considerations arising when these two 
technologies are combined.7 Furthermore, no scholar has yet asked 
the especially vexing questions presented by police use of FRT 
equipped body-worn cameras at public protests. This is not a 
purely academic exercise. Many police departments have, or will 
soon have, body-worn cameras equipped with real time FRT,8 and, 
                                                                                                     
 5. See, e.g., Zachary R. Blaes, Note, Cop-arrazi: Why Body Cameras Are 
Incompatible with the Fourth Amendment, 50 NEW ENG. L. REV. 15, 33 (2015) 
(concluding that police body-worn cameras should be held to violate the Fourth 
Amendment); Kelly Freund, Note, When Cameras Are Rolling: Privacy 
Implications of Body-Mounted Cameras on Police, 49 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 
91, 121 (2015) (arguing that “it is unlikely that the courts will find the use of 
body-mounted cameras to record individuals in public to be unconstitutional”); 
Erik Nielsen, Comment, Fourth Amendment Implications of Police-Worn Body 
Cameras, 48 ST. MARY’S L.J. 115, 141 (2016) (concluding that, under current 
doctrine, there is no Fourth Amendment violation any time a body-worn camera 
recording is made in a public place); Richard Shiller, Shooting in High Definition: 
How Having Tough Policies in Place Makes the Use of Body Cameras in Law 
Enforcement Comport with the Fourth Amendment, 51 NEW ENG. L. REV. 187, 195 
(2016) (arguing that, with the right police department policies in place, police use 
of body-worn cameras would not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
 6. See, e.g., Roberto Iraola, Lights, Camera, Action!—Surveillance 
Cameras, Facial Recognition Systems and the Constitution, 49 LOY. L. REV. 773, 
785–98 (2003) (concluding that “it is difficult to argue that the use of surveillance 
cameras, even in conjunction with facial recognition systems, constitutes a search 
when those cameras are directed at public places.”); Christopher S. Milligan, 
Facial Recognition Technology, Video Surveillance, and Privacy, 9 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L. J. 295, 318–20 (1999) (enumerating factors that courts would likely 
take into account in assessing whether police may use FRT consistently with the 
Fourth Amendment). 
 7. For authors who have adverted to this issue but not considered it in any 
depth see Freund, supra note 5, at 104, 123 (concluding that there “are few 
constitutional limits on the use of photographic database and FRT to scan faces 
in public in real-time.”); CLARE GARVIE, ALVARO BEDOYA & JONATHAN FRANKLE, 
THE PERPETUAL LINE-UP: UNREGULATED POLICE FACE RECOGNITION IN AMERICA 4 
(2016) (“If deployed pervasively on surveillance video or police-worn body 
cameras, real-time face recognition will redefine the nature of public spaces.”); 
Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth Amendment 
Framework for Analyzing Government Surveillance in Public, 66 EMORY L.J. 527, 
614 (2017) (“[A] body camera with biometric recognition capabilities is a 
significant technological enhancement . . . and could be far more susceptible to 
abuse”). 
 8. See VIVIAN HUNG, STEVEN BABIN & JACQUELINE COBERLY, A MARKET 
SURVEY ON BODY WORN CAMERA TECHNOLOGIES 410 (2016) (conducting market 
survey of 38 body-worn camera manufacturers and concluding that at least nine 
had FRT capabilities or were designed to be FRT capable in the future). 
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in Virginia, few police departments prohibit their members from 
recording public protests.9 This Comment aims to draw attention 
to this urgent issue. Although primarily descriptive—exploring the 
state of current Fourth Amendment doctrine by predicting its 
application to the hypothetical fact pattern set out above—this 
Comment has a normative subtext; namely, suggesting that First 
Amendment values can revivify a strong version of the Fourth 
Amendment that might then be transposed to situations with less 
obvious political dimensions. In this respect, this Comment 
contributes to the recent project of scholars like Thomas Crocker 
and Jed Rubenfeld who seek to emphasize the political character 
of the Fourth Amendment.10  
The Comment will proceed in three parts. Part II asks the 
question – as Fourth Amendment doctrine currently stands, would 
police use of FRT equipped body-worn cameras at public protests 
be characterized as a search? Part III proceeds to consider possible 
exceptions to the warrant requirement. Part IV asks whether, if an 
exception to the warrant requirement applied, the search would be 
reasonable in light of all the circumstances. Throughout the 
discussion, the Comment highlights the points at which First 
Amendment concerns are likely to exert pressure on the Fourth 
Amendment analysis. The ultimate aim of this Comment is to show 
how, when we sharpen our Fourth Amendment analysis on the 
edge of the First Amendment, we can envisage the Fourth 
Amendment as a robust check on the tide of technologically 
enhanced mass surveillance.  
 
                                                                                                     
 9. See FRANK KNAACK, GETTING TO WIN-WIN: THE USE OF BODY-WORN 
CAMERAS IN VIRGINIA POLICING 3 (2015) (estimating that only 3% of Virginia police 
departments prohibit their officers from recording public protests); see also 
Brennan Centre for Justice, Police Body Camera Policies: Privacy and First 
Amendment Protections, BRENNAN CENTRE FOR JUSTICE (Aug. 3, 2016), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/police-body-camera-policies-privacy-
and-first-amendment-protections (last visited Aug. 10, 2018) (identifying a 
number of police department across the country that require their officers to 
record public protests) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 10. Thomas P. Crocker, The Political Fourth Amendment, 88 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 303 (2010); Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101 (2008). 
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II. A Search or Not a Search? 
The Fourth Amendment relevantly protects “the right of the 
people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable 
search and seizures.”11 The “threshold question”12 in a case like the 
present is whether the government has conducted a “search.” 
Under current doctrine, a government action will be a search under 
the Fourth Amendment if it satisfies either of two conditions: a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” inquiry;13 or a “common-law 
trespassory test.”14 The Supreme Court has made clear that the 
former test is appropriate in situations like ours that involve 
“merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass.”15 
There are two limbs to this test: “first that a person have exhibited 
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”16 The actual expectation limb has been exposed to 
                                                                                                     
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The full text of the Fourth Amendment reads:  
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
space to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
 12. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 59 (1992). 
 13. The “reasonable expectation of privacy” test originated in Justice 
Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967). It 
subsequently became the orthodox approach. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 
U.S. 735 (1979); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); Bond v. United States, 
529 U.S. 334 (2000). 
 14. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–13 (2012) 
(articulating and applying the “common-law trespassory test” to find that the 
government action in issue was a search for Fourth Amendment purposes). For 
criticism of the supposed historical foundations of the trespassory test see Orin S. 
Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 
68 (2012) (stating that “no trespass test was used in the pre-Katz era. Neither the 
original understanding nor Supreme Court doctrine equated searches with 
trespass. Jones purports to revive a test that did not actually exist.”). 
 15. Jones, 565 U.S. at 411. See also Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 
2206, 2213 (2018) (applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test to a case 
involving the police collection of cell site location information). 
 16. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361; cf. Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth 
Amendment Privacy, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 139, 148 (2016) (reframing the Katz 
analysis: “in practice, the Katz test seems to ask the following: (1) Has the person 
in question waived her privacy in her information by knowingly exposing it to the 
8 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (2018) 
withering scholarly critique17 and is routinely ignored by the 
courts.18 Accordingly, the remainder of Part II is dedicated to 
discussing factors19 relevant to the other limb. 
                                                                                                     
public? and (2) If not, then could the person have had an objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the information?”). 
 17. See, e.g., James J. Tomkovicz, Technology and the Threshold of the 
Fourth Amendment: A Tale of Two Futures, 72 MISS. L.J. 317, 344–45 (2002) 
There is no good theoretical or practical reason for retaining the actual 
expectation prerequisite. That inquiry has never been determinative 
in a Supreme Court decision. That may be because any factor that 
leads to the conclusion that an individual has not manifested a 
subjective privacy expectation also supports the conclusion that society 
is unprepared to deem an expectation reasonable. The inquiry is 
superfluous or duplicative, at best. At worst, it has the potential to 
mislead lower courts into denying legitimate Fourth Amendment 
claims. Fourth Amendment threshold doctrine could only be improved 
by elimination of the “actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” 
demand. 
 18. See Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective 
Expectations, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 113, 117–18 (2015) (examining cases from 2012 
applying the Katz test and concluding that only 12% considered the subjective 
limb). 
 19.  For other authors’ lists of factors relevant to the “search” inquiry see 
Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing 
through Kyllo’s Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 
1393, 1406 (2001) [hereinafter Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms] 
(1) the nature of the place to be observed; (2) the steps taken to enhance 
privacy; (3) the degree to which the surveillance requires a physical 
intrusion onto private property; (4) the nature of the object or activity 
observed; (5) the extent to which the technology enhances the natural 
senses; and (6) the extent to which the surveillance is unnecessarily 
pervasive, invasive, or disruptive.  
Slobogin also identifies a seventh factor, “the availability of the technology to the 
general public”: see also Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical 
Surveillance:  The American Bar Association’s Tentative Draft Standards, 10 
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 383, 389–98 (1996) (describing the seven factors in more 
depth); Levinson-Waldman, supra note 7, at 530  
(1) the duration of the surveillance; (2) the lowering of structural 
barriers to pervasive surveillance, reflected in the greatly reduced cost 
of tracking; (3) the recording of an individual’s or group’s movements; 
(4) the elicitation of information from within a protected space such as 
a home; and, as appropriate, (5) whether the technology undermines 
CHILLING: CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS  9 
 
A. The Type of Activity Engaged In 
In Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it has been written that 
“certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from 
government invasion.”20 The paradigm example is the special 
Fourth Amendment sanctity afforded to the home,21 because it 
“provide[s] the setting for those intimate activities that the 
Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference 
or surveillance.”22 However, remembering that “the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places,”23 it is clear that the areas 
deserving scrupulous Fourth Amendment protection are not solely 
to be conceived of in physical terms; they can also include 
categories of activity or conduct. 
Crocker has made a convincing case for the Fourth 
Amendment to be read in a manner that is at least partially 
activity-orientated rather than purely location-focused.24 More 
specifically, Crocker relies on the First Amendment’s guarantee of 
a “right of the people” to frame the provision as an essentially 
political right that coheres with the First Amendment’s 
protections.25 Rubenfeld too emphasizes the words “the people” in 
the Fourth Amendment in contrast to the other individual-focused 
                                                                                                     
core constitutional rights and (6) whether surveillance technologies are 
piggy-backed on each other. 
 20. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984). 
 21.  See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (“At [the 
Fourth Amendment’s] very core stands the right of a man to retreat to his home 
and there be free from unreasonable government intrusion.”). 
 22. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179. 
 23.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 24. See generally Crocker, supra note 10; see also Rubenfeld, supra note 10 
(arguing, to similar effect, for a conception of the Fourth Amendment that is 
orientated to “security” rather than “privacy”); cf. Thomas K. Clancy, The 
Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 
979 (2011) (adopting an originalist analysis focused on the Fourth Amendment’s 
place in criminal procedure rather than its political valence). 
 25. Crocker, supra note 10, at 311 (“Fourth Amendment liberty protects 
public associations [and] private life . . . [and] allows us to see how rights against 
search and seizure coordinate with rights to speak and assemble.” Id. at 312 
“[T]extual placement of protecting ‘a right of the people’ indicates a political 
purpose better suited to protecting liberty than privacy alone.”). 
10 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (2018) 
criminal procedure guarantees in the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments.26 
Crocker and Rubenfeld’s structural and textual arguments are 
supported by an understanding of the Fourth Amendment’s origins 
in seditious libel cases. As is now widely accepted, the Fourth 
Amendment grew out of Founding-era admiration for a number of 
British cases—those of John Entick27 and John Wilkes28 being the 
most renowned—limiting the power of the State to seize the papers 
and effects of political opponents. The Supreme Court has 
acknowledged the essentially public and political concerns 
motivating the Fourth Amendment, observing: “It is true that the 
struggle from which the Fourth Amendment emerged ‘is largely a 
history of conflict between the Crown and the press.’”29 What flows 
from this historically grounded understanding of the Fourth 
Amendment’s political dimension? In an analogous context, the 
Supreme Court has said: “history indispensably teaches” that 
certain Fourth Amendment requirements must be applied with 
“scrupulous exactitude” when First Amendment freedoms are 
implicated.30 The same ought to be true in the present instance. In 
order to fully effectuate the Fourth Amendment’s political 
protections, a court confronted with our hypothetical fact pattern 
ought to scrupulously apply the Fourth Amendment’s search 
criteria to the impugned government action. 
B. Duration of Surveillance 
The duration of government surveillance is well recognized to 
be relevant in determining whether the government has infringed 
                                                                                                     
 26. Rubenfeld, supra note 10, at 120. 
 27. Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029 (C.P.) 1031. 
 28. Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 19 Howell’s State Trials 1153 (C.P.) 1167. 
 29. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978) (quoting Stanford v. 
Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 482 (1965)); see also United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 
498 (2d Cir. 1974) (recognizing the “historical background of the [Fourth] 
Amendment, with its stress on the seizure of books and papers on political 
affairs”). 
 30. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) (describing heightened 
warrant particularity requirements relating to searches and seizures of a citizen’s 
political books). 
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a reasonable expectation of privacy.31 In our present factual 
scenario the surveillance would have lasted no more than a few 
hours. While some authors have suggested that this may exceed 
the constitutional limit,32 it is likely that duration would be a factor 
weighing against categorization of the police conduct as a “search.” 
C. Technological Enhancement 
Where state surveillance entails the use of technology, the 
courts will consider the degree to which the technology enhances 
human information gathering capabilities.33 Alternately put, the 
courts will ask: “does the technology allow law enforcement to 
achieve an objective that would normally be circumscribed by the 
Fourth Amendment?”34 This concern is typically discussed in the 
context of cameras capable of zoom or magnification,35 but 
                                                                                                     
 31. See, e.g., United States v. Houston, 965 F. Supp. 2d 855, 873 (E.D. Tenn. 
2013) (holding that ten-week surveillance of a defendant’s private residence 
transgresses a reasonable expectation of privacy: “ten weeks crosses into the 
unreasonable, provoking an ‘immediate negative visceral reaction’ suggestive of 
the Orwellian state”). 
 32. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW 
GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 128 (2007) (suggesting 
that, for suspicionless individualized surveillance, the constitutional limit might 
be “a minute or so”). 
 33. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 629–62 (5th ed. 2012) (identifying that a primary consideration in 
the “search” stage of the court’s inquiry is “the level of sophistication of the 
equipment utilized by the police”). 
 34. John J. Brogan, Facing the Music: The Dubious Constitutionality of 
Facial Recognition Technology, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 65, 84 (2002). 
 35. See, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Fourth Amendment Future of Public 
Surveillance: Remote Recording and Other Searches in Public Space, 63 AM. U. L. 
REV. 21, 31 (2013) (“Police can use telescopes or extremely powerful zoom lenses 
to scrutinize details on a person’s clothing, or on items or documents removed 
from a wallet or briefcase, that would be invisible to bystanders just a few yards 
away”); Freund, supra note 5, at 120 (suggesting that “magnification” capabilities 
are relevant to the “search” inquiry); cf. Christopher Slobogin, Community 
Control over Camera Surveillance: A Response to Bennett Capers’s Crime, 
Surveillance, and Communities, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 993, 994 (2013) (arguing 
that the Supreme Court has regularly concluded that camera surveillance does 
not constitute a search “even when, in fact, members of the general public are . . 
. not likely to possess magnification devices of the type the police possessed”). For 
an example of a case in which technological magnification did not result in the 
attachment of the “search” label see Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 
227, 239 (1986) (holding that aerial surveillance using a specialized mapping 
12 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (2018) 
assumed special importance in the Supreme Court’s consideration 
of a more novel technology—thermal imaging—in Kyllo v. United 
States.36 In that case, police used a thermal imaging camera to 
detect heat emanating from inside a suspect’s house. Finding that 
such action constituted a search, the Court remarked: “obtaining 
by sense-enhancing technology any information . . . that could not 
otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a 
constitutionally protected area constitutes a search.”37 In Kyllo it 
was clear that, using only their natural senses, the police would 
have had to enter the house to obtain the same information they 
were able to obtain from outside with the benefit of thermal 
imaging technology. 
As applied to our imagined lawsuit, this factor suggests that 
the Charlottesville police’s actions ought to be described as a 
“search”. Given that the plaintiff was wearing a bandana 
concealing half of her face, it would not have been possible for 
police to identify her with the naked eye. The only way police could 
conceivably have identified the plaintiff without the aid of 
technology would have been to physically remove her bandana, 
which of course they could not do without “physical intrusion into 
a constitutionally protected area.” This consideration thus falls on 
the plaintiff’s side of the ledger, although one scholar has 
suggested that this factor is rarely determinative.38 
D. General Public Use 
Where a government action makes use of sense-enhancing 
technology, the extent to which that technology is in general public 
use will be a relevant factor in considering the reasonableness of a 
civilian’s expectation of privacy. For example, in Kyllo, the Court 
remarked on the fact that “the [thermal imaging] technology in 
                                                                                                     
camera was not a search for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment). 
 36. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 37. Id. at 34–35 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 38. Thomas K. Clancy, What Is a “Search” within the Meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1, 23 (2006) (“[T]he use of devices by law 
enforcement to enhance sight . . . [has] rarely changed the Court’s conclusion that 
no search occurred.”). 
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question is not in general public use.”39 Many commentators worry 
that the “general public use” consideration creates a one-way 
ratchet reducing constitutional protections as technology 
inevitably advances in capability, affordability and availability.40 
For the moment, however, this factor remains one that courts take 
into account. 
As applied to our hypothetical lawsuit, the City could quite 
reasonably claim that—given the widespread public use of camera 
phones at protests, including Charlottesville 2017—people 
attending such events can no longer claim a reasonable expectation 
that they will not be filmed. The police use of FRT, however, 
complicates things. It is true that rudimentary forms of FRT have 
been available to the public for over a decade,41 and that quite 
advanced forms of FRT may soon be available on smart phones.42 
Importantly, however, public users of FRT do not have access to 
the government’s expansive databanks of comparison images.43 
(Such databanks are now reported to contain images of 
approximately half of the nation’s adult population.44) Without a 
meaningfully large databank there is little utility to FRT.45 
                                                                                                     
 39. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34–35 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 40. See, e.g., Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms, supra note 19, at 1437; Quin 
M. Sorenson, Losing a Plain View of Katz: The Loss of a Reasonable Expectation 
of Privacy under the Readily Available Standard Comment, 107 DICK. L. REV. 179, 
195 (2002). 
 41. Iraola, supra note 6, at 796 n.115 (describing FRT available to the 
general public in the early 2000s). 
 42. Jake Laperruque, Apple’s FaceID Could Be a Powerful Tool for Mass 
Spying, WIRED, (Sept. 14, 2017 11:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/apples-
faceid-could-be-a-powerful-tool-for-mass-spying/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2018) 
(stating that Apple’s FaceID tool will use FRT to identify individuals and unlock 
their phones) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 43. This may soon change, see Jay Stanley, A Looming Implication of Face 
Recognition: Private Photo Blacklists, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION: FREE FUTURE 
(Apr. 16, 2018, 2:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-
technology/surveillance-technologies/looming-implication-face-recognition-
private-photo (last visited Aug. 10, 2018) (detailing the rise of “private photo 
blacklists”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 44. GARVIE, BEDOYA & FRANKLE, supra note 7 (“One in two American adults 
is in a law enforcement face recognition network.”). 
 45. Brogan, supra note 35, at 84 
Although the individual elements of facial scanning technology are 
widely available: cameras, recognition software, and databases, the 
power of a scanning system is its breadth: the dizzying quantity of 
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Accordingly, a proper understanding of the City’s use of FRT 
reveals that such capabilities are not in use by the general public. 
This consideration should thus support a finding that a Fourth 
Amendment “search” has occurred. 
E. Efforts to Shield Information from Public View 
In assessing whether to endorse as reasonable a particular 
expectation of privacy the courts generally take the view that a 
person’s actions in public do not attract a reasonable expectation 
of privacy. (This is not to be confused with the “plain view” 
exception to the warrant requirement.46) The rationale is that a 
person cannot expect privacy in information that they have 
voluntarily conveyed to anyone who would care to look.47 There 
are, however, limits to this rationale, especially when a person has 
made efforts to shield their information from public view. Thus in 
Katz v. United States—a case where the FBI bugged a public phone 
box—it was significant that Mr. Katz had closed the phone box 
door, in what was understood to be an effort to shield his 
conversation from other members of the public. Justice Harlan 
explained: “What a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is 
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks 
                                                                                                     
interlinked cameras and baseline databases. To that extent, facial 
scanning systems are in no more common use by the general public 
than was the thermal sensing technology used in Kyllo. (citation 
omitted). 
 46. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, at 599  
[T]he concern here is with plain view in quite a different sense, namely, 
as descriptive of a situation in which there has been no Fourth 
Amendment search at all. This situation, which perhaps is deserving 
of a different label so as to avoid confusion . . . encompasses those 
circumstances in which an observation is made by a police officer 
without a prior physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected 
area. 
 47. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (explaining 
that a person driving on public roads can have no reasonable expectation in the 
privacy of their movements). 
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to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may 
be constitutionally protected.”48 
This principle coheres with the “container doctrine”, which 
recognizes a reasonable privacy interest in the contents of a sealed 
container, even where that container is in a public place. Under 
this doctrine, “a traveller who carries a toothbrush and a few 
articles of clothing in a . . .  knotted scarf [may] claim an equal 
right to conceal his possessions from official inspection as the 
sophisticated executive with the locked attaché case.”49 As 
analogized to the present hypothetical, one might think of the 
plaintiff’s bandana as equivalent to the closed phone box door or 
the knotted scarf.50 The plaintiff’s efforts to shield her identifying 
information—namely, her face—from public view should 
distinguish her case from earlier biometric data cases in which the 
courts refused to recognize a Fourth Amendment search.51 
Accordingly, this factor supports the plaintiff’s claim of a 
reasonable expectation that her identity would remain private at 
the Charlottesville protest. 
                                                                                                     
 48.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); cf. United States v. 
Wymer, 40 F. Supp. 3d 933, 938–39 (N.D. Ohio 2014) (the fact that no efforts had 
been made to “shield the property from public view” counted against the 
reasonableness of any expectation of privacy). See also Carpenter v. United 
States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (“A person does not surrender all Fourth 
Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere.”). 
 49. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982). 
 50.  On the dangers of analogical reasoning in Fourth Amendment cases 
involving new technologies see Marc McAllister, The Fourth Amendment and New 
Technologies: The Misapplication of Analogical Reasoning, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 475, 
477 (2011) (“In rejecting Fourth Amendment claims involving warrantless use of 
sophisticated technologies, courts often rely upon analogies to prior ‘search’ cases, 
but these supposed analogies are so far removed from the new forms of 
surveillance that analogies to them only confuse, rather than clarify, the actual 
analysis required by Katz.”). 
 51. See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1972)  
The physical characteristics of a person’s voice, its tone and manner, 
as opposed to the content of a specific conversation, are constantly 
exposed to the public. Like a man’s facial characteristics, or 
handwriting, his voice is repeatedly produced for others to hear. No 
person can have a reasonable expectation that others will not know the 
sound of his voice, any more than he can reasonably expect that his 
face will be a mystery to the world. 
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F. Conclusion to Part II 
In concluding our discussion of the indicia of a search under 
the Fourth Amendment it is worth adverting to some broader, 
overarching policy considerations likely to play out in any court’s 
analysis of the “search” issue. Any determination of whether or not 
a practice is a search is, after all, “a value judgment.”52 Some 
judges would likely look to find that no search occurred in this case, 
because such a finding would avoid involving the courts in the 
inevitably messy task of adjudging the “reasonable” use of rapidly 
developing technology.53 Conversely, other judges might worry 
about concluding that no search has taken place because to do so 
would effectively immunize this powerful new technology from any 
judicial oversight.54 This anxiety would be compounded by worries 
that the technology might “chill” First Amendment expression and 
association (this will be discussed in Part IV.B.). It is unlikely that 
any “chill” could be addressed by way of a direct First Amendment 
challenge,55 because of the unhelpful standing jurisprudence that 
                                                                                                     
 52. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 
MINN. L. REV. 349, 403 (1974) (describing the “search” question as a “value 
judgment” as to “whether, if the particular form of surveillance practiced by the 
police is permitted to go unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of 
privacy and freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a compass 
inconsistent with the aims of a free and open society”). 
 53. This cautious, non-interventionist approach is also recommended by 
some scholars. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New 
Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 
801, 805 (2003)  
[C]ourts should place a thumb on the scale in favor of judicial caution 
when technology is in flux, and should consider allowing legislatures 
to provide the primary rules governing law enforcement investigations 
involving new technologies. . . . When technology is in flux, Fourth 
Amendment protections should remain relatively modest until the 
technology stabilizes. 
 54. Tomkovicz, supra note 17, at 325 (“The significance of the threshold issue 
is hard to understate. If the employment of a new investigatory tool is not a search 
at all, it is outside the sphere of Fourth Amendment regulation, and government 
authorities are at liberty to use it whenever they wish, without need for prior 
justification.”). 
 55. Cf. Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 151 (2007) (advocating for First Amendment remedies against 
government information gathering: “[T]he First Amendment should serve as an 
independent source of procedure to protect expressive and associational activity 
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governs claims of “chilled” speech.56 Accordingly, it may be that 
First Amendment concerns guide the court to a Fourth 
Amendment result, namely a finding that the conduct is a “search” 
and thus susceptible to judicial oversight.57 
III. An Exception to the Warrant Requirement? 
“To say that the Fourth Amendment applies here is the 
beginning point, not the end of the analysis.”58 Assuming, for 
argument’s sake, that the City’s use of FRT equipped body-worn 
cameras is found to be a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, 
what then? Given that no warrant was obtained, the search would 
be considered “per se unreasonable”59 unless it could be brought 
within an exception60 to the warrant requirement.61 Many of the 
                                                                                                     
from government information gathering.”). 
 56. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972) (considering government 
practice of monitoring the political activities of anti-war activists, the Court held 
that the “subjective chill” on the protestors’ First Amendment rights did not 
satisfy standing requirements of objective harm or threat of specific future harm); 
Stauber v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 9162 (RWS), 2004 WL 1593870, at *19 
(S.D.N.Y. Jul. 16, 2004) (finding Fourth Amendment, but not First Amendment, 
standing of individual plaintiff to challenge bag searches at public protests); cf. 
Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1316–25 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that the 
local authority’s proposal to subject political demonstrators to a metal detector 
search violated the First Amendment). 
 57. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, at 651  
To say that a particular type of police practice is not a search is to 
conclude, in effect, that such activities [are outside of the court’s 
regulation]  . . . thus the push must be in the direction of applying the 
“search” appellation to those varieties of police conduct we are not 
prepared to leave totally uncontrolled. 
 58. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 1969 (2013). 
 59. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
 60. Half a century ago it was said that exceptions to the warrant 
requirement are “jealously and carefully drawn.” Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 
493, 499 (1958). It is now closer to the truth that the warrant requirement is “so 
riddled with exceptions that it [is] basically unrecognizable.” California v. 
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991). See also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 
2482 (2014) (stating that “the label ‘exception’ is something of a misnomer in this 
context, as warrantless searches incident to arrest occur with far greater 
frequency than searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.”). 
 61. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482 (“In the absence of a warrant, a search is 
reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant 
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recognized exceptions—such as consent62 and “plain view”63—are 
inapplicable to the present facts, but there are at least two 
exceptions that might arguably be engaged. 
A. Exigent Circumstances 
The Court has recognized that, in certain circumstances, “‘the 
exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so 
compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment.”64 There are a number of common 
fact patterns under this doctrine, including: pursuit of a fleeing 
suspect,65 prevention of imminent evidence destruction,66 and 
searches of premises where the occupant is seriously injured or 
                                                                                                     
requirement.”). 
 62. One could imagine the City arguing that the plaintiff consented to being 
filmed with FRT equipped body-worn cameras by attending the protest. This 
would be a difficult argument for the City to maintain absent proof that the 
plaintiff had actually been aware of the advance police notifications regarding the 
use of FRT at the protest. Even if the City could establish knowledge on the part 
of the plaintiff this should not necessarily be equated with consent, especially 
given her attempts to conceal her face with a bandana. As a general rule, consent 
is an inapposite warrant exception to apply to mass surveillance techniques. See 
SLOBOGIN, supra note 32, at 127 (“[T]he notion that people consent to public 
surveillance simply because they proceed with their business after having been 
notified that cameras are present is disingenuous at best. Consent implies that 
realistic alternatives exist.”); see also Ric Simmons, Searching for Terrorists: Why 
Public Safety Is Not a Special Need, 59 DUKE L.J. 846, 905–06 (2010) (arguing 
that “implied consent” in this context should be deemed an “unconstitutional 
constraint”); Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1324 (11th Cir. 2004) (describing 
the requirement to submit to a search in order to engage in First Amendment 
expression as “an especially malignant unconstitutional condition”); cf. Johnston 
v. Tampa Sports Authority, 530 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding that a 
visitor to a sports stadium impliedly consented to a pat-down search that was 
conducted on all patrons). 
 63. Properly understood, the “plain view” exception to the warrant 
requirement applies in circumstances where police incidentally observe or seize 
evidence in the course of an otherwise lawful search or seizure. The plain view 
exception to the warrant requirement has no application in circumstances such 
as the present where the initial search or seizure is what is subject to 
constitutional challenge. LAFAVE, supra note 33, at 599. 
 64. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978). 
 65. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1967). 
 66. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011). 
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threatened with such injury.67 Importantly, the exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement is only 
properly engaged when there is a specific threat (often amounting 
to probable cause68) that would make obtaining a warrant 
impractical.69 
At first blush this exception might look attractive to the City. 
The argument would be that, as the violence at Emancipation Park 
subsided, police reviewed the body-worn camera footage out of fear 
of further violence. Alternately, the City might try to analogize the 
present facts to a “hot pursuit” situation. A close reading of our 
plaintiff’s case reveals that these arguments are foreclosed by the 
chronology of events. The search at issue here began at the 
moment that the police body-worn camera recorded the plaintiff’s 
face and matched that face to an identity (the search did not begin 
only when police look at the body-worn camera footage). This was 
before any risk of violence and certainly before any attempted 
police pursuit. The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant 
requirement does not apply to the sort of precautionary or 
prophylactic search at issue here. 
B. Special Needs 
Arguably more appropriate would be the “special needs” 
exception—an outgrowth of the “administrative search” 
exception70—so often invoked by police to justify terrorism related 
dragnet searches.71 Developed in the face of a perceived uptick in 
domestic terrorism in the late 1960s,72 the special needs exception 
                                                                                                     
 67. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400 (2006). 
 68. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, at 308 (asserting that a warrantless search 
of personal effects requires probable cause). 
 69. King, 563 U.S. at 473 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“Circumstances qualify 
as ‘exigent’ when there is an imminent risk of death or serious injury, or danger 
that evidence will immediately be destroyed, or that a suspect will escape.”). 
 70.  See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 822–23 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(describing “special needs” searches and “administrative” searches as distinct 
exceptions to the warrant requirement but noting that they are “not necessarily 
mutually exclusive”). 
 71. See Simmons, supra note 62, at 850–86 (reviewing case law and tracing 
the origins and development of the special needs doctrine through a slew of 
terrorism cases). 
 72. See id. at 850–59 (describing how the “administrative search” doctrine 
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to the warrant requirement was designed to apply to “those 
exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the 
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-
cause requirement impracticable.”73 The central requirement of 
the special needs doctrine is that the government’s “direct”, 
“primary” or “immediate” purpose74 must be something other than 
a “general interest in crime control,”75 “the normal need for law 
enforcement”76 or “crime detection.”77 The distinction between a 
special need and a general interest in crime control has, at times, 
proved elusive.78 
Outside of the anti-terrorism context, the Supreme Court has 
relied on the special needs doctrine to uphold suspicionless 
sobriety checkpoints to protect the public from the dangers of 
drunk driving.79 Yet, a decade later, the Court refused to endorse 
suspicionless vehicle checkpoints for drug searches, explaining 
that the checkpoints were designed to “detect evidence of ordinary 
criminal wrongdoing”80 and this went no further than a “general 
interest in crime control.”81 While the special needs cases have 
been described to be in “a state of disarray,”82 the Court appears to 
have drawn a distinction between prophylactic protection against 
crime and after-the-fact detection of crime; only the former will be 
capable of amounting to a special need. 
                                                                                                     
was developed in response to more aggressive government surveillance practices 
after domestic terrorism incidents in the late 1960s and early 1970s). 
 73. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting Justice 
Blackmun’s concurrence in the aforementioned case). 
 74. Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83–84 (2001). 
 75. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18 (1979). 
 76. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351. 
 77. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997). 
 78. See, e.g., Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(suggesting that protecting the public and enforcing the law are “inextricably 
intertwined”). 
 79. Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990). 
 80.  Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41–42 (2000); see also Chandler v. 
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997) (explaining that “crime detection” alone cannot 
constitute a special need). 
 81. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41. 
 82. Simmons, supra note 62, at 887. 
CHILLING: CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS  21 
A number of lower courts have convincingly articulated the 
dangers of carving out a special needs warrant exception for 
anti-terrorist policing,83 however just such an exception appears to 
have emerged. In MacWade v. Kelly,84 the Second Circuit upheld 
the practice of random searches in the New York City subway 
system to meet the special need of “preventing a terrorist attack.”85 
That same year a differently constituted Second Circuit wrote: “It 
is clear to the Court that the prevention of terrorist attacks on 
large vessels engaged in mass transportation . . . constitutes a 
‘special need.’”86 In the air travel context, the special need of 
protecting against terrorist attacks has been widely accepted for 
decades.87  
In our case, the City would likely argue that they were acting 
in furtherance of a special need to protect against domestic 
terrorism of the sort that occurred in Charlottesville in 2017. 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions and some national security 
scholars appear to agree that the events of Charlottesville 2017 
may properly be labelled “domestic terrorism.”88 Given the burden 
                                                                                                     
 83.  See Bourgeois, 387 F.3d at 1311  
While the threat of terrorism is omnipresent, we cannot use it as the 
basis for restricting the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protections 
in any large gathering of people. In the absence of some reason to 
believe that international terrorists would target or infiltrate this 
protest, there is no basis for using September 11 as an excuse for 
searching protestors. 
see also Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 306–07 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(cautioning that courts remain “vigilant in protecting constitutional rights” even 
when faced with claimed threats of terrorism); United States v. U.S. Dist. Court 
of the E.D. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972) (prohibiting the federal government 
from warrantless surveillance of people who were alleged to be domestic 
terrorists). 
84 460 F.3d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 85. Id. at 263. 
 86. Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67, 82 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 87. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, at 326–57 (reviewing airport search case law 
from the late 1960s until today). 
 88. See Charlie Savage & Rebecca R. Ruiz, Sessions Emerges as Forceful 
Figure in Condemning Charlottesville Violence, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/us/politics/domestic-terrorism-
sessions.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2018) (reporting on Session’s description of 
Charlottesville 2017 as “domestic terrorism”) (on file with the Wasington and Lee 
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of the case law, the need to protect against a repeat of such events 
would probably satisfy the description of a “special need”. 
C. Conclusion to Part III 
If, as I have predicted, the City’s actions in Charlottesville fall 
within the “special needs” exception to the warrant requirement 
that would not end the inquiry. The description of a particular 
factual situation as an “exception” is somewhat deceptive because 
the “ultimate touchstone”89 of the Fourth Amendment is 
“reasonableness.” Finding an “exception” applicable is best 
understood to return the court to an open textured 
“reasonableness” inquiry.90 As was explained in an early special 
needs case, “the legality of a [special needs] search . . . should 
depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, 
of the search.”91 
IV. Reasonableness 
The Supreme Court has said that “where a Fourth 
Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs . . . it is 
necessary to balance the individual’s privacy expectations against 
the Government’s interests.”92 In what follows, I identify a number 
                                                                                                     
Law Review); Mary B. McCord, Criminal Law Should Treat Domestic Terrorism 
as the Moral Equivalent of International Terrorism, LAWFARE (Aug. 21, 2017, 1:59 
PM), https://lawfareblog.com/criminal-law-should-treat-domestic-terrorism-
moral-equivalent-international-terrorism (last visited Aug. 10, 2018) 
(characterizing the events of Charlottesville 2017 as domestic terrorism) (on file 
with theWashington and Lee Law Review). 
 89. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 
 90. See Simmons, supra note 62, at 895 (“all of the current suspicionless 
antiterrorism cases—after applying the special needs test to bypass the general 
requirement of a warrant and probable cause—essentially apply a reasonableness 
analysis.”); see, e.g., Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (explaining that 
a search falling within an exception to the warrant requirement must still satisfy 
a reasonableness inquiry: “the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness”). 
 91. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340–41 (1985). 
 92. Von Raab v. United States, 489 U.S. 656, 665–66 (1989). 
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of factors93 that would feature in the “balancing analysis”94 in our 
plaintiff’s case. 
A. The Specificity of the Threat 
When the government interest is identified as “deterring 
highly hazardous conduct” like terrorism, the courts will generally 
give great weight to that interest in the “reasonableness” inquiry.95 
The greater the danger posed to public safety, the more likely a 
court is to find the search reasonable.96 It remains unclear, 
however, what degree of specificity of threat is required to 
reasonably justify suspicionless searches. At one end of the 
continuum, it is relatively settled that a search of political 
protestors will not be found to be reasonable purely on the basis of 
an “omnipresent” threat of terrorist attacks at large public 
gatherings.97 Similarly, courts will be reluctant to uphold searches 
                                                                                                     
 93. For other taxonomies of relevant factors see Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and 
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1097, 1120–25 (1998) 
(discussing factors relevant to determining whether a search is reasonable, 
including: the intrusiveness of the search; the importance of the governmental 
interest; and the identity of the person being searched); Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 
F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 2006) (listing the balancing factors as “(1) the nature of the 
privacy interest involved; (2) the character and degree of the governmental 
intrusion; and (3) the nature and immediacy of the government’s needs, and the 
efficacy of its policy in addressing those needs.”); MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 
268–69 (2d Cir. 2006) 
[T]he court determines whether the search is reasonable by balancing 
several competing considerations. These balancing factors include 
(1) the weight and immediacy of the government interest; (2) “the 
nature of the privacy interest allegedly compromised by” the search; 
(3) “the character of the intrusion imposed by” the search; and (4) the 
efficacy of the search in advancing the government interest. (citations 
omitted). 
 94. Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990). 
 95. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 675 n.3 (discussing suspicionless searches 
conducted at airports). 
 96. See, e.g., Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449–52 (upholding the constitutionality of 
suspicionless sobriety tests of drivers and noting the grave danger posed by drunk 
drivers to public safety). 
 97. See Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1311–12 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding 
that a proposal to subject all protestors to a metal detector search was 
unreasonable). 
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of political protestors based on “overly vague” evidence or a 
“general invocation of terrorism threats.”98 Instead, what these 
more demanding cases require is a “fixed and distinct” threat, 
rather than one that is “indefinite or generalized.”99 Relevant to a 
court’s inquiry will be whether there is a “history of injury or 
violence” in relation to the specific event or events like it.100 
As against these cases there is dicta from the Supreme Court 
to the effect that “where the risk to public safety is substantial and 
real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may 
rank as ‘reasonable.’”101 Lower courts have noted that 
suspicionless searches at airports occur absent any evidence of 
specific threat and, accordingly, have upheld suspicionless 
searches on public transportation.102 In so doing, one court 
explained that a search will be held to be reasonable where there 
is a generalized but “high risk” of terrorism associated with the 
particular services or activity targeted—in that case, “mass 
transportation”.103 The Second Circuit has further explained, 
quoting from the Supreme Court: “All that is required is that the 
‘risk to public safety [be] substantial and real’ instead of merely 
‘symbolic.’”104 In the present case, the 2017 acts of violence at 
Charlottesville would likely provide sufficiently specific evidence 
of a threat of repeated domestic terrorist activity. The court would 
                                                                                                     
 98. Stauber v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 9162 (RWS), 2004 WL 1593870, 
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 101. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) (emphasis added), quoted in 
MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 272 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 102 See, e.g., American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Massachusetts 
Bay Transp. Auth., No. 04-11652-GAO, 2004 WL 1682859 (D Mass. July 28, 2004) 
(upholding suspicionless searches of bus and train passengers around the 2004 
Democratic National Convention); Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(upholding suspicionless searches of passengers on a ferry). 
 103 Cassidy, 471 F.3d at 82, 83–84 (observing “the government has a ‘special 
need’ to prevent [terrorist attacks] from developing, and courts have readily 
acknowledged the special government need in protecting citizens in the mass 
transportation context” and explaining, further, that “the airline cases make it 
clear that the government, in its attempt to counteract the threat of terrorism, 
need not show that every ferry terminal is threatened by terrorism”). 
 104 MacWade, 460 F.3d at 272 (quoting Chandler, 520 U.S. at 322-23). 
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then need to balance this threat against countervailing 
considerations in the reasonableness calculus. 
B. The Nature of the Privacy Intrusion (Enter the First 
Amendment) 
As against the government interest in protecting against 
terrorist attacks the court would have to weigh the plaintiff’s 
privacy interest.105 It is at this point that First Amendment values 
would likely enter the analysis.106 The Supreme Court has 
instructed: “in . . . determining the reasonableness of a search, 
state and federal magistrates should be aware that ‘unrestricted 
power of search and seizure could also be used as an instrument 
for stifling liberty of expression.’”107 In this spirit, the plaintiff 
would likely argue that the potential “chill” to First Amendment 
expressive activities and associations should count against a 
finding that the police conduct was reasonable.108 The concern here 
                                                                                                     
 105 Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42–43 (2000) 
[T]he gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of questions 
concerning what means law enforcement officers may employ to pursue 
a given purpose. Rather . . . in determining whether individualized 
suspicion is required, we must consider the nature of the interests 
threatened and their connection to the particular law enforcement 
practices at issue. 
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (“[W]e generally determine 
whether to exempt a given type of search from the warrant requirement ‘by 
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s 
privacy.’” (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). 
 106 See Wilkinson v. Forst, 832 F.2d 1330, 1339 (2d Cir. 1987) (examining 
the Fourth Amendment constitutionality of weapons searches at Ku Klux Klan 
rallies and accepting that First Amendment jurisprudence was relevant to the 
analysis); Stauber v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 9162 (RWS), 2004 WL 
1593870, at *31 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 16, 2004) (analyzing the reasonableness of bag 
searches at a public protest and taking into account the “danger of discouraging 
constitutionally protected expression” and the danger of attaching “stigma” to the 
persons searched); Stauber v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 9162 (RWS), 2004 
WL 1663600, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2004) (“A . . . search in the context of the 
exercise of constitutionally protected speech calls for a different analysis.”). 
 107 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978) (quoting Marcus v. 
Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 727 (1961)). 
 108 See Freund, supra note 5, at 106 (articulating concern that 
“body-mounted cameras would chill political and other types of speech.”); 
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is not with body-worn camera surveillance per se, which would 
likely only have a minor “chilling” effect,109 but with the use of FRT 
in combination with body-worn cameras. 
This argument proceeds from an understanding that certain 
people only engage in expressive action or association, especially 
unpopular action or association,110 when they believe that they can 
remain anonymous in doing so.111 To strip such people of their 
anonymity, the argument goes, would have the effect of 
discouraging the sort of speech and association at the heart of the 
First Amendment.112 Paradoxically, the fact that the City gave 
advance notice of the proposed use of FRT—a factor which usually 
minimizes privacy intrusion113—could have heightened the 
chilling effect as it may have deterred people from attending the 
protest at all. Effects aside, any evidence of intent on the part of 
                                                                                                     
SLOBOGIN, supra note 32, at 99 (“[I]f public conduct is expressive—for instance, a 
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 109 See Levinson-Waldman, supra note 7, at 612 (noting that, “ironically”, 
the chilling effect of body-worn cameras may “be mitigated in some degree by the 
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 110 See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) (striking down a 
prohibition on anonymous handbills, the Court noted: “Persecuted groups and 
sects from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive 
practices and laws either anonymously or not at all.”). 
 111 See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 
197–98 (1999) (referring to evidence presented to the District Court establishing 
that compelling petition circulators to wear name badges inhibited participation, 
especially relating to “volatile” political issues). 
 112 See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) 
(striking down, as violating the First Amendment, an Ohio Code provision that 
prohibited the distribution of anonymous campaign literature); NAACP v. 
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (finding that the state of Alabama could not, 
consistently with the First Amendment, compel the NAACP to disclose its 
membership lists); see also SLOBOGIN, supra note 32, at 101 (“People who engage 
in expressive conduct in public know they will be observed. But they may 
choose . . . not to reveal their identity, for all sorts of reasons. Camera 
surveillance virtually nullifies that effort.”). 
 113 See Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 463 (1990) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J., and Marshall, J.) (“There is a 
critical difference between a seizure that is preceded by fair notice and one that 
is effected by surprise.”). 
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the City to discourage the protest entirely would almost certainly 
be fatal to a “reasonableness” finding.114 
One final, but important, consideration is that the FRT used 
here operated in real time, not retrospectively. The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Buckley v. American Constitutional Law 
Foundation, Inc. suggests that after-the-fact government 
identification of political actors is not as grave a concern as 
identification of actors in the “precise moment” of the First 
Amendment event.115 On this reasoning, a police department 
might be permitted to record protestors and to subject that footage 
to FRT after the protest ended, but would not be permitted to film 
protestors using real time FRT. Accordingly, this factor tends 
against a reasonableness finding in our hypothetical. 
C. The Degree to Which the Search Advances the Government 
Interest 
Where a warrant exception applies and the court reverts to a 
generalized reasonableness analysis, it will interrogate the degree 
to which the search advances the government interest.116 In our 
case, two considerations present as relevant: first, the extent to 
which body-worn cameras served to protect against the identified 
                                                                                                     
 114 See Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 (2000) (explaining that, 
contrary to most other areas of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the 
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 116 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (“[W]e generally 
determine whether to exempt a given type of search from the warrant 
requirement ‘by assessing . . . the degree to which it is needed for the promotion 
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295, 300 (1999)); see also Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 
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interest”). 
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threat; and, secondly, the extent to which the police use of body-
worn cameras was limited to achieve its purpose.117 
On the first of these issues, the case law requires that the 
government search be a “sufficiently productive mechanism to 
justify the intrusion upon Fourth Amendment interests.”118 This 
does not require the government to show that the search is the 
most productive means of achieving its interest,119 however the 
government’s case will be assisted by at least some empirical 
data120 showing “how the searches will reduce the threat.”121 In our 
case, as in the challenge to passenger searches on the New York 
City subway, the City would likely argue that the search would 
deter terrorist activity.122 More specifically, the City would argue 
that the advertised123 presence of FRT equipped cameras would 
cause any rational person to think twice before engaging in 
violence. This reliance on what some have called the “civilizing 
effect”124 of body-worn cameras is not entirely supported by the 
empirical data. A recent study of body-worn cameras in 
Washington, D.C. showed that civilians interacting with police 
officers wearing body-worn cameras were more likely to assault the 
officers than civilians who were interacting with camera-free 
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(noting that the suspicionless search at issue in that case was not preceded by 
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officers.125 Nevertheless, courts deciding these questions have 
exhibited reluctance to “peruse, parse, or extrapolate” empirical 
data, and instead tend to defer to government experts and elected 
officials.126 Accordingly, considered “at the level of design,”127 a 
court is likely to accept the plausibility of the City’s argument that 
FRT cameras would deter potential violence at the Charlottesville 
2018 protests. 
On the second question—relating to the extent to which the 
search was limited to achieving its purpose—the government need 
not show that the search was “the least restrictive means” of 
achieving its objective,128 but there must be a “close fit” between 
the scope of the search and the objective.129 In order to answer this 
question in the context of our hypothetical, a court would need to 
look into the City’s body-worn camera policies relating to 
activation, data retention, storage and publication. It is likely that 
any court would be reluctant to give Fourth Amendment 
imprimatur to a body-worn camera policy that appears 
overexpansive and without sufficient safeguards relating to 
individualized data.130 Slobogin has argued, in the context of 
                                                                                                     
 125 DAVID YOKUM, ANITA RAVISHANKAR & ALEXANDER COPPOCK, EVALUATING 
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 126 See MacWade, 460 F.3d at 274  
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require the government to adopt the least intrusive practicable alternative, there 
must be a fairly close fit between the weight of the government’s interest in 
searching and the intrusiveness of the search.”). 
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on police databases. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 155 (2009) (Ginsburg, 
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CCTV, that strict policies regulating storage and publication of 
body-worn camera footage would help bring a particular recording 
within the range permitted by the Fourth Amendment.131 In fact, 
Slobogin has conducted empirical research that suggests that 
people consider camera surveillance significantly less intrusive 
when footage is destroyed after a short period of time rather than 
permanently retained.132 Another proposal that might ensure a 
meaningful connection between the special need and the search 
itself is if there were a policy in place prohibiting review of the 
footage except where an incident of domestic terrorism in fact 
eventuated.133 Absent detailed evidence of the City’s body-worn 
camera policy, however, it is difficult to predict how a court would 
decide this particular question. 
D. Conclusion to Part IV 
In concluding our “reasonableness” discussion, and 
remembering that this question will always entail value-based 
judgments,134 it is worth highlighting the two competing policy 
interests likely to dominate the court’s analysis. On the one hand, 
                                                                                                     
not slim. . . . Inaccuracies in expansive, interconnected collections of electronic 
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 131  SLOBOGIN, supra note 32, at 129. 
 132 Id. at 111. (reporting on survey of 190 respondents asked to rate the 
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courts have traditionally been reluctant to curtail law enforcement 
efforts that are both non-discriminatory and effective at protecting 
the public.135 On the other hand, the judiciary has recently been a 
zealous protector of First Amendment interests.136 Absent the First 
Amendment issues, it is likely that most courts would prioritize 
public safety in the balancing exercise. This has been a common 
criticism of the balancing test in anti-terrorism contexts: that the 
risk of catastrophic consequences inevitably pushes the courts 
towards limiting Fourth Amendment protections.137 Here, 
however, it might be hoped that the potential First Amendment 
“chill” would persuade the court to find a Fourth Amendment 
violation. 
V. Conclusion 
The above analysis has been primarily descriptive, rather 
than normative, in the hope of revealing just how far the Fourth 
Amendment has been eroded by technological advancements and 
the normalization of mass surveillance.138 The courts are not 
                                                                                                     
 135 See Morgan Cloud, Rube Goldberg Meets the Constitution: The Supreme 
Court, Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 72 MISS. L.J. 5, 38 (2002) 
(describing the Court’s “barely constrained enthusiasm for the emergence of new 
technologies and their inevitable use by law enforcers”). 
 136 See Tabatha Abu El-Haj, “Live Free or Die”—Liberty and the First 
Amendment, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 917, 917 (2017) (reviewing Roberts Court case law 
and asserting: “Recent years have witnessed an extraordinary expansion of the 
First Amendment.”); Peter M. Shane, “The Expanding First Amendment” in an 
Age of Free Speech Paradox, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 773, 773 (2017) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court in recent years has broadened the domain of communicative activity 
covered by the First Amendment’s ‘speech’ protection and has limited in other 
ways the capacity of government to regulate communication based on content.”). 
 137 See Simmons, supra note 62, at 897 (“[A]ntiterrorist searches are 
particularly ill suited to a generalized balancing test . . . for the simple reason 
that the gravity of the potential harm is so great that it overpowers any other 
variable that could be placed into the balancing equation.”); Anthony C. Coveny, 
When the Immovable Object Meets the Unstoppable Force: Search and Seizure in 
the Age of Terrorism, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 329, 384 (2007) (“[W]henever a bright 
line rule is replaced by a balancing test, civil liberties are likely to lose.”); see, e.g., 
United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974) (“When the risk is the 
jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and millions of dollars of property . . . the 
danger alone meets the test of reasonableness, so long as the search is conducted 
in good faith . . . and with reasonable scope [and with advance notice].”). 
 138 See, e.g., Travis S. Triano, Note, Who Watches the Watchmen? Big 
Brother’s Use of Wiretap Statutes to Place Civilians in Timeout, 34 CARDOZO L. 
32 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (2018) 
unaware of this danger.139 This Comment has suggested that the 
one hope for a check on this trend might be in contexts where 
Fourth Amendment rights are coupled with First Amendment 
interests. It is in these instances that the courts might be willing 
to revivify the robust political protections that the Fourth 
Amendment was intended to enforce. 
                                                                                                     
REV. 389, 409 (2012) (stating that “being subject to a video recording is an 
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